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THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY: LESSONS
FOR CORPORATE LAW
JONATHAN R. MACEY*
INTRODUCTION
Legal scholarship examining the recent emergence of the limited
liability company has primarily focused on the legal treatment of these
entities.' A successfully formed limited liability company is a noncorporate
entity that provides its owners with protection against liability for enterprise
obligations, as well as the pass-through tax treatment traditionally
associated with partnerships and Subehapter S corporations. At the same
time, the limited liability company form allows investors to remain actively
involved in the management of the enterprise.
The purpose of this Article is different. Rather than exploring whether
(or how well) the limited liability companies achieve their common
intended purpose of reducing the contract, tort and tax liabilities of their
investors, this Article explores the implications of the emergence of the
limited liability company for our understanding of corporate law. What
does the modem emergence of the limited liability company tell us about
the state of American corporate law? This Article argues that the emergence
of the limited liability company has much to tell us about a variety of
important topics in corporate law, particularly the reasons for requiring
formal incorporation, jurisdictional competition for corporate charters, the
costs and benefits of limited liability, and the structural problems that may
hamper sweeping reform of corporate and tort law rules affecting enterprise
and investor liability.
This Article begins with a brief discussion of the limited liability
company. The second part of the Article discusses the features that may
* J. DuPratt White Professor of Law, Cornell University, and Director, John M. Olin Program
in Law and Economics. I am grateful to Cornell Law School, and to the International Centre for
Economic Research in Turin, Italy, where much of the research on this Article was conducted, for their
generous support of my research activities. In addition, Matthew Bibbens and Kevin Hartzell, both of
the Cornell Law School class of 1996, Shari Wolkon, Cornell Law School class of 1995, and Kevin
Roberto Sommello, University of Turin class of 1995, provided valuable research assistance.
I. See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge et al., The Limited Liability Company: A Study of the Emerging
Entity, 47 Bus. LAW 375 (1992).
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motivate state legislatures to enact statutes enabling the formation of
limited liability companies. The subsequent parts of the Article discuss the
lessons that the limited liability company provides. This Article argues that
the emergence of the limited liability company reveals and seeks to address
certain fundamental deficiencies with the structure and organization of
corporate law. The final part of the Article offers some conclusions.
I. THE LIMITED LIABILITY COMwANY
Limited liability company statutes typically provide for the formation of
a limited liability company by two or more persons.2 As with traditional
corporations, a filing with a statutorily specified department of state
government must be made before the enterprise can legally exist. The
precise information required in these filings differs from state to state;
however, typical disclosure requirements include the name of the potential
limited liability company, the period of proposed duration of the enterprise,
and the resident agent for service of process.3
In general, the purpose of forming a limited liability company is to create
an entity that offers investors the protections of limited liability and the
flow-through tax status of partnerships. Unlike partnerships, where entity
profits flow through to individual partners, corporations are treated as
separate taxable entities under the Internal Revenue Code. Hence, from the
investors' perspective, the income of a corporation is subject to double
taxation. The double taxation results from the income earned by the
corporation first being taxed to the corporation at the prevailing rates
applicable to corporate earnings.4 If the corporation then distributes income
to investors, these investors must pay taxes at whatever rate is applicable
to their status.' For firms that wish to distribute income in the form of
dividends and that have owners in high tax brackets, it is often desirable
to do business in some form that allows income to be distributed from the
organizational level to the investors without being taxed at the organiza-
tional level. This, of course, is what occurs with partnerships, Subehapter
2. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.405 (West Supp. 1995) ("Two or more persons may form
a limited liability company."); NEv. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.151 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 48-2b-103
(1994); WYo. STAT. § 17-15-106 (Supp. 1994).
3. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 608.407 (West 1993) ("Articles of Organization"); WYo. STAT.
§ 17-15-107 (Supp. 1994).
4. I.R.C. § 11 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
5. Id. §§ 301, 316 (1988). See generally ROBERT W. HAMILTON, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN
BusImNss 295-96 (1989) (describing the problems associated with the duplicative tax treatment of
corporations).
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S corporations, limited partnerships, and, finally, with limited liability
companies.6
But in order for an entity such as a limited liability company to qualify
for pass-through tax treatment,7 and thereby avoid the double taxation of
distributions, the entity must possess more "noncorporate characteristics"
than "corporate characteristics."' The critical issue in determining whether
a limited liability company will be taxed like a corporation or a partnership
is how closely it resembles a corporation. The applicable U.S. Treasury
Regulations provide that a firm is a corporation rather than a partnership
if it has three of the following characteristics: (1) continuity of life; (2) free
transferability of interests; (3) centralization of management; and (4) limited
liability.' Because limited liability companies offer limited liability as a
matter of course, to ensure partnership tax status, limited liability
companies must lack two of the three remaining characteristics." More-
over, the Internal Revenue Service has clearly stated that it will grant
partnership (i.e., pass-through) tax status to limited liability companies as
long as they do not possess the corporate characteristics of continuity of
life and free transferability of interests."
Unlike general partners in traditional general or limited partnerships,
investors in limited liability companies are not liable, directly or indirectly,
for any debts, obligations or liabilities of either the limited liability
company or of the other investors. In this way, limited liability companies
are like limited partnerships. Indeed, significant portions of most of the
enabling statutes for limited liability companies were modelled on enabling
legislation for limited partnerships. 2 However, unlike limited partnerships,
limited liability companies have no single general partner who is exposed
to unlimited personal or corporate liability.
In terms of the broad protections offered against third party liability,
limited liability companies most closely resemble Subchapter S corpora-
6 See Edward J. Roche, Jr. et al., Limited Liability Companies Offer Pass-Through Benefits
Without S Corp. Restrictions, 74 J. TAx'N 248 (1991).
7. In general, the pass-through approach taxes the members of the entity but not the entity itself.
See I.R.C. §§ 701-702 (1988).
8 Treas. Reg. § 301-7701-2(a)(1) (as amended in 1993).
9. Id.
10. See Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 424.
11. Rev. Rul. 88-76, 1988-2 C.B. 360, 361.
12. See Wayne M. Gazur & Neil M. Goff, Assessing the Limited Liability Company, 41 CASE W.
RES L. REv. 387, 389 (1991) (discussing the origins of the Wyoming and Florida limited liability
company statutes).
1995] 435
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tions. However, unlike S corporations, limited liability companies cannot
be formed in perpetuity without losing their flow-through tax status. This
limitation exists because, as noted above, the Internal Revenue Service
requires that limited liability companies limit their duration in order for the
lack of perpetual existence to be considered a "noncorporate characteris-
tic.""3 This is clearly accomplished in such states as Colorado, Virginia
and Nevada, in which limited liability companies, by definition, lack
continuity of life and dissolve at the expiration of a fixed period (or earlier
in case of unanimous agreement of the members, or the death, retirement,
resignation, bankruptcy, or expulsion of a partner) unless all of the
remaining investors agree to continue the business."
However, the disadvantage suffered by limited liability companies as a
result of their finite duration is, for many firms, offset by the fact that they,
unlike S corporations,' 5 are free from restrictions on the type and number
of shareholders they may have, and on the ability of such shareholders to
make allocations and deductions of income from the firm. In particular,
Subchapter S limits the number of shareholders in Subchapter S corpora-
tions to thirty-five, forbids the creation of more than one class of stock, and
prohibits the firm from owning a subsidiary. 6 And, like other corpora-
tions, S corporations have restrictions on the amount of dividends they can
pay, must maintain certain capital accounts, and must be managed by a
board of directors or an equivalent body. 7 None of these restrictions on
organization and management are imposed on limited liability companies.
In addition to the foregoing restrictions on corporate structure, there are
also tax disadvantages to Subchapter S corporations as compared with
partnerships and limited liability companies.' While partners may include
their share of the partnership's debts in determining their basis for purposes
of calculating the taxes to be paid on partnership distributions, shareholders
in Subchapter S corporations must allocate income in direct proportion to
their interests in the corporation. 9
The advantages of limited liability companies over partnerships have
13. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
14. COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-801 (Supp. 1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1046(3) (Michie 1993);
Nay. REv. STAT. ANN. § 86.491 (1991).
15. I.R.C. § 1361(b)(1) (1988).
16. Id. § 1361(b)(1)-(2).
17. Gazur & Goff, supra note 12, at 445.
18. See generally id. at 454-57 (comparing tax ramifications of the choice between a limited
liability company and an S corporation).
19. I.R.C. § 1377 (1988).
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caused one commentator to argue that this new organizational form may
lead to the death of partnerships, because "[m]ost firms that now organize
as general partnerships probably will not continue to do so once restrictions
on limited liability have been loosened through recognition of the [limited
liability company form]."2 If this prediction proves correct, a business
environment may emerge in which all firms except sole proprietorships
would enjoy the benefits of limited liability, and all firms except publicly
traded corporations could enjoy the benefits of pass-through tax treat-
ment.2
I. THE POLITICS OF LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY STATUTES
As the preceding section demonstrates, the limited liability company is
not difficult to understand. Such companies are privately held firms that
combine the corporate-form benefits of centralized management and limited
liability with the partnership-form benefits of pass-through tax treatment
and organizational flexibility. It is not hard to imagine why states would
want to authorize the formation of such ventures. Investors clearly will
prefer limited liability to unlimited liability. Limited liability reduces
exposure to loss, reduces insurance costs, and increases incentives for
engaging in potentially profitable risk-taking. The only costs to investors
come in the form of additional borrowing costs from creditors whose risks
are increased by limited liability. But these higher borrowing costs can
easily be avoided by contract if the borrower values less expensive credit
higher than the benefits associated with limited liability. Participants in
limited liability companies who wish to avoid additional borrowing costs
20. Larry E. Ribstein, The Deregulation of Limited Liability and the Death of Partnership, 70
WASH. U. L.Q. 417, 427 (1992).
2 1. Publicly traded firms cannot, for structural reasons, achieve pass-through tax treatment. As
noted above, because all limited liability companies have limited liability, to achieve pass-through tax
treatment a firm must lack two of the following three features: central management, continuity of life,
and free transferability. But, as Larry Ribstein has pointed out, because of the uncertainty surrounding
these characteristics, it would be dangerous for a limited liability company to risk the disastrous
consequences of being retroactively classified as a corporation for tax purposes. Larry E. Ribstein, Form
and Substance in the Definition of a Security: The Case of Limited Liability Companies, 51 WASH. &
LEE L. REv. 807, 821 (1994). Moreover, any firm of significant size will have centralized management.
Consequently, a firm will have to lack both continuity of life and free transferability of interests in order
to be assured of pass-through tax treatment. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text. Because
publicly traded firms have free transferability of interests by definition, these firms will never satisfy
this test. The desire to protect the tax status of limited liability companies explains why every state's
enabling statute authorizing the formation of such companies restricts, without exception, the
transferability of interests. See Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 427-28.
1995]
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simply can contract to provide further security to some or all of their
creditors through personal guarantees.
Moreover, the creation of limited liability companies has provided a
boon to lawyers and accountants who provide the legal and tax advice
necessary to form these new entities, and has provided state governors who
have clear antibusiness tax records with the opportunity to enact probusi-
ness legislation.' And, as Saul Levmore has pointed out, even partners
that shift from a partnership form to a limited liability company form in
midstream-that is, after they have been doing business as a partner-
ship---could conceivably enjoy the benefits of limited liability, "even
though many of these firms' contractual creditors will be caught by
surprise."'
Of course, any innovation produces losers as well as winners and this is
true of the limited liability company as well. Creditors, particularly future
tort creditors of limited liability companies, are clear losers, especially
when the limited liability firms imposing the damages on tort victims
would otherwise have been organized as partnerships. However, future tort
victims, by definition, are unidentified and lack political force, in contrast
with investors, whose identities are known and whose financial resources
and political connections are prodigious. Thus, it is not surprising that the
political debates surrounding the adoption of limited liability company
enabling statutes have not featured much concern about the expansion of
limited liability beyond previous confines.
None of the foregoing is meant to state that the costs of the limited
liability company outweigh the benefits. Rather, the point is simply to
emphasize that the costs and benefits issue is an empirical question, and
that it is far too early in the history of these new organizational forms to
make definitive conclusions about it. In particular, it is unclear how much
new business activity will be generated by the opportunities presented by
these entities. Moreover, as discussed in more detail below, it is question-
able how courts will respond to these new organizational forms. Perhaps
courts will be more willing to pierce the corporate veil if they believe that
these new forms are being used to shield investors from the consequences
of excessive risk-taking. And perhaps these forms will lead legislatures to
see the costs as well as the benefits of jurisdictional competition for
22. Former New York Governor Mario Cuomo being the prime example. See Daily Rep. for
Executives (BNA) No. 149, at H-8 (Aug. 5, 1994).
23. Saul Levmore, Partnerships, Limited Liability Companies, and Taxes: A Comment on the
Survival of Organizational Forms, 70 WASH. U. L.Q. 489, 491 (1992).
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corporate control.
The following parts of this Article explore these issues from the
perspective of the general landscape of corporate law. The parts argue that
the advent of the limited liability company has at least as much to teach us
about U.S. law relating to business organizations as the U.S. law of
business organizations has to teach us about limited liability firms.
III. REASONS FOR REQUIRING FORMAL INCORPORATION
Like traditional corporations, limited liability companies come into
existence upon the filing of a document with some statutorily designated
state functionary, typically the Secretary of State. Completion of these
statutory formalities is a necessary precondition to achieving limited
liability.24 Thus, the limited liability company brings into sharp focus the
fact that under U.S. law, the critical feature that distinguishes business
organizations whose investors enjoy limited liability from business
organizations whose investors are subject to unlimited personal liability is
the necessity for a filing with a state official.
The obligation to complete a filing with a state official in order to obtain
the benefits of limited liability is a strange requirement for jurisdictions to
employ. There does not seem to be any relationship between a filing and
the granting of limited liability. This point seems particularly true under
modem state corporation statutes, which turn the formation of a corporation
into a purely routine matter, far simpler even than purchasing a house or
drafting a will.
The traditional reasons given for requiring a filing include: to give notice
to third parties, to identify the state of incorporation, and to enable the
states to collect fees. None of these reasons clearly justify the filing
requirement. Plainly, the filing requirement is not necessary in order to
notify third parties that the firm's investors have limited liability. Every
state law governing limited liability companies requires in the firm's name
the words "Limited Liability Company," "LLC" or similar language
indicating that the business organization is one that offers investors limited
liability.25 Similar requirements exist under general corporate law.26 This
24. See Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 386.
25. Id. at 410 n.243.
26. See REVISED MODEL BusiNEss CORP. Acr § 2.01 (1984) (requiring the articles of
incorporation to contain a corporate name); id. § 4.01(a)(1) (specifying that the corporate name must
contain the word "corporation," "incorporated," "company, or "limited,' the abbreviation "corp.,"
"inc ," "co.," or "ltd,," or words or abbreviations of like import in another language).
1995]
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requirement is sufficient to provide notice to third parties. Moreover, the
filing requirement serves primarily to protect the firm's investors, so from
the perspective of notice to third parties, filing should be voluntary at best.
Another argument for requiring investors to complete a filing before
limited liability attaches relates to statutory domicile. In the United States,
firms can select their states of incorporation as they wish. And, unlike
European company law, American corporate law provides that a firm's
statutory domicile is unrelated to its physical location, and allows for a
change of domicile with shareholder consent." Thus, it might be argued
that the formality of a filing requirement is necessary in order to be
completely clear about which state's rules will apply in the absence of any
such filing. But, as with the argument about limited liability, the formal
filing requirement protects the investors. Consequently, there is no reason
to impose sanctions on firms that do not file. Nonfiling firms simply would
bear the risk that the law being applied in a particular case might not be the
law they would have selected had they filed. Similarly, contracting parties,
such as potential investors, who are concerned about which jurisdiction's
laws will be applied in the event of litigation, can contract as to which
particular jurisdiction's laws will apply in case of a dispute, or can even
require that a firm file articles of incorporation in a particular jurisdiction
to ensure that the laws of that jurisdiction will apply.
A more realistic concern is that a jurisdiction that did not require a
formal filing might find it more difficult to collect the fees associated with
the creation of a limited partnership, corporation or limited liability
company. One might even argue that these franchise and chartering fees are
the price that firms pay for the privilege of limited liability. Similarly, and
perhaps more importantly, the filing requirement creates a need for the
cadres of white collar bureaucrats necessary to process the requisite
corporate forms. And, of course, the filing requirement creates artificial
demand for the services of the lawyers who prepare the papers that must
be filed in order for a firm to achieve limited liability status.
IV. JURISDICTIONAL COMPETITION AND LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANIES
The previous part makes clear that, as is the case with traditional
corporations, limited liability companies offer states the opportunity to
collect fees and to create demand for the services of influential constituen-
cies. Thus, states have incentives to become attractive venues for the
27. ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW 1 (1993).
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formation of limited liability companies. It seems fairly clear that a limited
liability company organized in one state can do business in another state
without fear of losing its limited liability. Indeed, several states expressly
provide that the law of the jurisdiction in which the limited liability
company is organized should be used to govern the liability of the
company's investors.28 With respect to the other states, as Keatinge,
Ribstein, Hamill, Gravelle and Connaughton have pointed out:
[T]he choice of law rules under the Restatement [(Second) Conflict of Laws],
the common law principle of comity, and the Full Faith and Credit Clause
and the Interstate Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution all indicate that
in actions against an LLC in a foreign jurisdiction, the foreign court should
treat the LLC as though it were a foreign corporation and should apply the
limited liability provisions of the LLC's state of organization.29
The implication of this analysis is clear. As is the case with general
corporate law, it seems that a limited liability company could file the
requisite papers necessary to achieve limited liability status in one state,
while doing most or all of its business in other states. Thus, jurisdictional
competition for limited liability company charters, similar to the competi-
tion for general corporate charters that Delaware currently leads, could
develop as states vie with each other for the chartering fees associated with
the formation of limited liability companies.
There is much literature debating the costs and benefits of jurisdictional
competition for corporate charters. The literature can be subdivided into
three general analytical schools of thought: (1) the race-to-the-bottom
school; (2) the corporate federalist school; and (3) the public choice school.
While important modifications must be made to these theories before they
can be applied in the limited liability company context, each of these
theories has interesting implications for the issue of jurisdictional
competition for limited liability company charters.
A. The Race-to-the-Bottom Theory
The phrase "race-to-the-bottom" was coined by Professor William Cary
in his essay, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Dela-
28. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 7-80-901 (Supp. 1994); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 17-7636(a) (Supp. 1993);
TEX. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 1528n, art. 7.02 (West Supp. 1992); VA. CODE ANN. § 13.1-1051
(Michie 1993).
29. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 456.
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ware."0 Cary argued that the state of Delaware, which has long been the
leading producer of corporate law in the United States, has adopted a policy
of pandering to the selfish private interests of corporate management in
order to cause such corporate managers to select Delaware as their
preferred state of incorporation. Behind this school of thought lies both the
recognition that Delaware is the leading state in the jurisdictional
competition for corporate charters and the contention that "there is no
public policy left in Delaware except the objective of raising revenue." 1
The origins of the race-to-the-bottom theory can be found in The Modern
Corporation and Private Property, the classic 1932 book by Adolph Berle
and Gardiner Means, in which they observed that the separation of
ownership and control was the distinguishing feature of the modem
business corporation." The Berle-Means hypothesis stated that the highly
dispersed shareholders in large, publicly held corporations would be unable
to galvanize into an effective political coalition to monitor and control the
incumbent management of the firms in which they had invested.3
Consequently, management possessed the real power to control corporate
affairs, and would seek to incorporate in jurisdictions with laws that were
friendly to their perspective, even if hostile to the interests of sharehold-
ers.
3 4
Whatever the general problems with this analysis, and there are many,35
the race-to-the-bottom theory is almost wholly inapplicable in the limited
liability company context. Limited liability companies are primarily formed
in order to obtain pass-through tax status. And, the combination of
attributes required to obtain pass-through tax status makes it highly unlikely
that a qualifying entity will have the high degree of separation of
ownership and control necessary to create the organizational dynamics that
concerned Berle and Means. In order to have separation of ownership and
control, an organization must have centralized management and investors
with no ties to management who will demand free transferability of
30. William L. Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J.
663 (1974).
31. Id. at 684.
32. ADOLPH A. BERLE, JR. & GARDmER C. MEANs, TnE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE
PROPERTY 4 (1932).
33. Id. at 4-5.
34. Id. at 136-38.
35. See Roberta Romano, Law as a Product: Some Pieces of the Incorporation Puzzle, 1 J.L.
ECON. & ORGANIzATION 225, 265-73 (1985) (arguing that shareholders benefit most from state
competition).
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interests. Thus, limited liability companies that are characterized by the
Berle-Means separation of ownership and control simply exhibit too many
of the determinative "corporate characteristics" to qualify for pass-through
tax treatment under current IRS interpretations."
B. Corporate Federalism
The corporate federalist theory holds more promise for predicting the
likely future contours of jurisdictional competition for limited liability
company charters. The corporate federalists, who are generally aligned with
the law and economics movement, argue that states succeed in the
jurisdictional competition for corporate charters by offering a package of
off-the-rack corporate law rules that enhance investor welfare. Their
rationale is that competition in the product market for the goods and
services produced by the firm, competition in the capital markets by firms
seeking to sell debt and equity, and competition in the managerial labor
market and the market for corporate control combine to limit the ability of
incumbent management to engage in activities that are contrary to the best
interests of a firm's shareholders.
The corporate federalists' argument has been made most forcefully by
Judge Ralph Winter:
It is not in the interest of Delaware corporate management or the Delaware
treasury for corporations chartered there to be at a disadvantage in raising
debt or equity capital in relation to corporations chartered in other states.
Management must induce investors freely to choose their firm's stock instead
of, among other things, stock in companies incorporated in other states or
other countries....
[A] corporation's ability to compete effectively in product markets is
related to its ability to raise capital, and management's tenure in office is
related to the price of stock. If management is to secure initial capital and
have access to capital in the future, it must attract investors away from the
almost infinite variety of competing opportunities. Furthermore, to retain its
position, management has a powerful incentive to keep the price of stock
high enough to prevent takeovers, a result obtained by making the corporation
an attractive investment.37
In an important refinement and extension of the corporate federalist
perspective, Professor Roberta Romano has shown that Delaware leads the
36. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
37. RALPH K. WINmR, GovERNMENT AND THE CORPORATION 10-11 (1978).
1995]
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jurisdictional competition for corporate charters because it has made a
credible commitment to develop and maintain an advanced, sophisticated
system of corporate law.3" In particular, Delaware depends more than
other states on the franchise revenues associated with the chartering
business because such revenues comprise a large portion of the state's
budget.39 Moreover, Delaware has a number of assets that are specific to
its status as the foremost purveyor of state-of-the-art corporate law. As
Professor Romano noted, these assets include the state's "comprehensive
body of case law, judicial expertise in corporation law, and administrative
expertise in the rapid processing of corporate filings."'4
Romano's powerful analysis of the jurisdictional competition for
corporate charters suggests that any state which decides to specialize in
developing a sophisticated body of law relating to limited liability
companies could conceivably become dominant in the provision of charters
to limited liability companies in the same way that Delaware is dominant
in the provision of charters to publicly held corporations.
Nonetheless, Delaware has a clear head start in this competition because
the expertise developed by the Delaware judiciary in the field of corporate
law is, to a large extent, directly transferable to issues that may arise
regarding limited liability companies. However, many of the legal disputes
that arise among participants in limited liability companies are likely to
involve issues analogous to those facing small, closely held corporations,
rather than issues that pertain to large, publicly held companies. And, there
is some evidence that Delaware's corporate code and Delaware's rules of
corporate governance are especially tailored to large, publicly held
companies, rather than smaller companies with concentrated share
ownership.4' If this is the case, a state other than Delaware likely will
become dominant in the jurisdictional competition for the charters of
limited liability companies. This proposition is likely to be true despite the
fact that, in many states, limited liability companies can be organized with
corporate-type centralized management42 rather than the more diffuse
38. ROMANO, supra note 27, at 39.
39. See Curtis Alva, Delaware and the Market for Corporate Charters, 15 DEL. J. CORP. 885, 888
n.8 (1990) (noting that 20% of Delaware general fund revenues come from franchise taxes and fees).
40. RoMANo, supra note 27, at 39.
41. Barry D. Baysinger & Henry N. Butler, The Role of Corporate Law in the Theory of the Firm,
28 J.L. & ECON. 179, 183-84 (1985) (explaining that Delaware corporate law favors those corporations
with greater share dispersion).
42. CoLo. REv. STAT. § 7-80-401(I) (Supp. 1994); MIN. STAT. § 322B.606 (Supp. 1995); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 10-32-69 (Supp. 1993); OKLA. STAT. tit. 18, § 2013 (Supp. 1995); TEx. REV. Civ. STAT.
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management structure observable in partnerships.
Delaware has never been dominant in attracting chartering business from
small, closely held corporations. As Romano has observed:
[Wlhen ownership of a firm is concentrated, the explicit provisions of a
corporation code do not matter much, because a controlling shareholder, and
hence management, can implement chosen policies without difficulty
regardless of the statutory provisions (they have control of the firm). There
is thus no reason [for a firm] to move [from its home state of incorporation]
to incur the higher costs of a Delaware domicile until the owners anticipate
undertaking new activities, or reducing control, whereupon legal rules will
loom larger.43
Thus, because firms have no need for the services provided by an expert
judiciary, such as the one that exists in Delaware, it may be possible that
no jurisdictional competition in the market for issuing limited liability
company charters will emerge among states. The small degree of separation
between ownership and control in most limited liability companies will
allow management to obtain the flexibility afforded by Delaware corporate
law without the necessity of incorporating in Delaware.
Bolstering this analysis is the empirical finding that firms that are on the
verge of undergoing major, organic changes are more likely to reincorpo-
rate than other firms,' because of the increased probability of shareholder
litigation associated with fundamental corporate changes. Put differently,
as Romano has postulated, it appears likely that firms change their original
state of domicile when they anticipate engaging in transactions that could
be undertaken at a lower cost if the firm were chartered in another state.45
Reduced costs arise either because the new state of domicile has a legal
system that reduces the costs of entering into business, or because "the
firm's new activities [are] more likely to bring it into contact with the legal
system than before, that is, they [are] activities that tend to generate
minority shareholder litigation... "46 Consistent with this prediction,
Romano found that most reincorporations preceded or coincided with a
series of distinct and identifiable transactions, such as mergers and
acquisitions, the adoption of antitakeover devices, or most often, public
ANN. art. 1528n, art. 2.12 (West Supp. 1995).
43. ROMANO, supra note 27, at 47.
44. Romano, supra note 35, at 249.
45. Id.
46. Id.
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offerings, particularly the first public offering by a firm.47
Thus, according to Professor Romano's general theory about the nature
of jurisdictional competition for corporate charters, it is unlikely that
limited liability companies will produce vigorous competition among states
for their chartering business. Limited liability companies are less likely to
be sued than publicly held corporations because limited liability companies
have fewer public shareholders to bring derivative-type suits. Moreover,
limited liability companies do not engage in the sorts of organic corporate
changes that will precipitate reincorporation under friendlier state law.
C. Public Choice
Of course, the very fact that forty-six states have adopted enabling
legislation allowing the formation of limited liability companies is strong
evidence that jurisdictional competition in fact exists. The cost to a state of
offering an attractive limited liability company statute is higher than the
cost to a state of offering attractive corporate law. Whenever a business
forms as a limited liability company instead of as a "C" corporation, states
face a possible loss of tax revenue. The C corporation's distributions to
shareholders are subject to double tax liability, while the distributions by
the limited liability company will be subject to pass-through tax treat-
ment.48 Indeed, it is these tax benefits that prompt investors to form
limited liability companies in the first place. Thus, states must have
determined that the losses from forgone tax revenue associated with the
promulgation of these limited liability company statutes would be even
greater than the losses associated with having investors form limited
liability ventures in other jurisdictions.
Interestingly, states are not required to conform with the federal tax
treatment of limited liability companies. Most states do not deviate from the
federal provisions and allow pass-through partnership treatment of limited
liability companies without any entry-level taxes or fees.4 9 However, it
would be possible for states to impose their own individual tax treatment
on limited liability companies. For example, the New York statute provides
that limited liability companies must pay an annual fee determined by
multiplying the number of members of the corporation by fifty dollars."0
47. Id. at 250.
48. See supra notes 6-7 and accompanying text.
49. See Brian L. Schorr & Sylvia Wong, Limited Liability Company Law, Part Thvo, N.Y. L.J.,
July 14, 1994, at 11 (discussing New York State tax treatment of limited liability companies).
50. Id.
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In addition, limited liability companies in New York City must pay the four
percent unincorporated business tax on net income that the city requires
partnerships to pay." But despite that it would be possible for states to
require that limited liability companies pay taxes at the same rate as
corporations, most states appear to be forced by competitive pressure to
conform their tax treatment of such entities to the federal practice, which
permits pass-through tax treatment.
Thus, the very existence of limited liability companies supports the
hypothesis that there is vigorous competition among states for chartering
revenues, and that most states (not only Delaware) are responsive to
competitive pressures. Moreover, it is significant that states feel this
competitive pressure in the limited liability company context even though
no state is likely to become as dominant in this market as Delaware has
become in the competition for the charters of traditional corporations.
V. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF LIMITED LIABILITY
As noted above, limited liability companies afford investors and
managers protection against liability for the debts and obligations of the
firm. Generally, members of limited liability companies are not liable,
directly or indirectly (or by way of indemnification, contribution or
otherwise), for the debts, obligations or liabilities of the firm. Similarly,
unlike in the partnership context, members are not liable for the tort or
contractual obligations of other members of the firm, even when those
obligations have been incurred in the conduct of the firm's business. The
exception to this general rule is that each member of a limited liability
company will be liable for the consequences of her own wrongful or
negligent acts, as well as for wrongful or negligent acts of people under her
direct supervision.52
These liability provisions distinguish limited liability companies from
general partnerships, in which all partners are generally liable for the debts
of the partnership, and from limited partnerships, which have at least one
general partner that is fully liable for the debts and obligations of the
partnership. 53 In his response to Professor Ribstein's suggestion that firms
should be able to choose freely among various types of organizational
51. There is minimum annual fee of $325 per limited liability company, and a maximum annual
fee of $10,000. Id.
52. Keatinge et al., supra note 1, at 443.
53. Id. at 385.
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forms (some with and some without limited liability),54 Saul Levmore
suggests that limited liability is appropriate only when necessary to permit
the pooling of capital.5 Thus, from Professor Levmore's perspective, in
a variety of contexts in which limited liability companies have become
popular, such as venture capital projects, theatrical undertakings, and real
estate and oil and gas investments involving a small number of investors,
limited liability may be inappropriate.
The public policy problem with limited liability is clear. If society has
properly configured the legal rules affecting investors, firms and markets,
then firms should only be willing to invest in projects until the marginal
benefits of such projects equal the marginal costs. And, critical to this
social cost-benefit analysis is the reality that some of the costs associated
with a firm's investments may cause damage to third parties such as
creditors and victims of torts perpetrated by the firm.
The problem with limited liability is that sometimes the costs suffered
by these third parties are not internalized by the people who make (and
benefit from) the decisions about what types of projects the firm should
pursue. In other words, when members of a limited liability company
evaluate possible investment options, they are likely only to consider those
marginal costs and benefits associated with the investments that they will
be required to internalize. Consequently, these members will pursue
projects that are suboptimally risky from the perspective of society as a
whole. Put simply, limited liability allows investors to pursue extremely
risky projects and to profit from the pursuit of a "heads I win; tails you
lose" strategy of project finance. The members divide the spoils of risky or
dangerous projects that turn out well, while the costs associated with
projects that turn out badly are largely borne by creditors and "innocent"
tort victims. At an aggregate level, this imbalance results in overinvestment
in hazardous industries and a concomitant underinvestment in other
industries.
This proclivity to engage in excessive risk-taking, known to economists
as moral hazard, exists not only in the context of the various types of
business organizations (corporations, limited partnerships, limited liability
companies) that offer investors limited liability, but also whenever an
individual or group that causes harm lacks the resources to provide
compensation to injured parties. Clearly, fixed claimants such as employees,
54. See Ribstein, supra note 21.
55. See Levmore, supra note 23, at 492.
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trade creditors, lenders, and other contractual creditors are in a different
position vis-A-vis the limited liability company than are tort victims. These
fixed claimants will demand compensation, in the form of higher wages,
higher prices or higher interest payments, for the risk that the debtor will
shift its resources to increasingly risky ventures after the credit has been
extended.
In addition to demanding a risk premium as compensation for limited
liability, both creditors and limited liability debtors have incentives to craft
credible agreements to refrain from engaging in excessive risk-taking in
order to minimize wage costs, costs from suppliers and borrowing costs.
The fact that firms enjoying limited liability must pay for the projected
additional costs associated with such limited liability tends to align the
social benefits and the social costs of their activities. For this reason, even
those commentators who favor abandoning limited liability for tort creditors
favor retaining limited liability for contract claimants.56
Indisputably, the emergence of limited liability company statutes has
caused some firms that would otherwise organize as partnerships to instead
organize as limited liability companies. Thus, the advent of the limited
liability company form has expanded the ability of investors to externalize
the risks associated with their business ventures. Economic theory would
therefore predict that the emergence of the limited liability company will
raise the level of risk-taking beyond its previous levels. Moreover,
economic theory also suggests that much of this new risk-taking will be
suboptimal from a societal perspective, because the people making the
decisions to pursue these risky activities are not going to bear the full costs
of the damages they impose on others.
The point here is to place the expansion in perspective, rather than to
assert that the extension of limited liability to members of limited liability
companies is bad policy. This conclusion would be wrong for a variety of
reasons, as the following sections explain. First, limited liability generates
social benefits that offset the social costs described above. Second, the
broad legislative grant of limited liability provided by state legislatures is
tempered by common law judicial craftsmanship, particularly the judicial
practice of disregarding the corporate entity under certain circumstances.
Finally, once it is acknowledged that limited liability is necessary for the
pooling of capital, then it is impossible to refrain from extending the
56. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Liability for Corporate Torts, 100
YALE L.J. 1879, 1881, 1919-20 (1991) (arguing that market forces compensate contractual creditors for
limited recourse).
1995]
Washington University Open Scholarship
WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
benefits of limited liability to smaller firms such as limited liability
companies without creating serious economic distortions.
A. Social Benefits from Limited Liability
One powerful argument for limited liability is that creditors are, in some
contexts, superior risk bearers to shareholders.5 7 This argument seems to
have particular force in the context of certain limited liability companies.
Consider, for example, a limited liability company involved in theatre
productions, software development, or oil and gas investments. The
creditors of these ventures likely hold a diversified portfolio of loans to a
variety of similarly situated concerns. Accordingly, the risks of default by
one debtor are offset by the cash flows associated with the timely
repayment by other debtors. By contrast, the members of these hypothetical
limited liability companies likely have undiversified human capital
investments in a particular limited liability company. As such, the limited
liability enjoyed by limited liability companies under their respective
enabling statutes may simply be a low-cost way of codifying the arrange-
ments that such firms would reach with their creditors as a matter of
contract (or by forming a partnership) in the absence of such statutes.
Even where the investors in limited liability companies are able to
diversify their holdings, limited liability may be of value to them because
it enables this diversification. Investors can minimize their risks by owning
a diversified portfolio of assets. An investment in a limited liability
company could easily be a part of an investor's diversified portfolio of
investments. By holding a diversified portfolio, an investor can eliminate
the firm-specific risk associated with holding individual assets. However,
if the assets in the investor's portfolio do not possess the attribute of
limited liability, then "[d]iversification would increase rather than reduce
the risk" of investing."8 Each investment that poses the risk of unlimited
liability increases the risk that losses associated with those investments will
consume the remainder of the portfolio.
Moreover, it may be efficient for limited liability companies to operate
under a regime of limited liability because limited liability obviates the
need for the members of such firms to monitor their fellow members.
57. This argument, first advanced by Richard Posner, see Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors
of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499 (1976), has been criticized by Frank Easterbrook
and Dan Fischel, see Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel TL Fischel, Limited Liability and the Corporation,
52 U. CHI. L. REv. 89 (1985).
58. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 57, at 97.
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Easterbrook and Fischel's argument concerning shareholders in the context
of the general corporation would seem to apply with equal force in the
context of limited liability companies:
[L]imited liability reduces the costs of monitoring other shareholders. Under
a rule exposing equity investors to additional liability, the greater the wealth
of other shareholders, the lower the probability that any one shareholder's
assets will be needed to pay a judgment. Thus existing shareholders would
have incentives to engage in costly monitoring of other shareholders to ensure
that they do not transfer assets to others or sell to others with less wealth.
Limited liability makes the identity of other shareholders irrelevant and thus
avoids these costs.59
Of course, the costs involved in monitoring fellow shareholders or members
of limited liability companies, while significant, still may be less than the
costs imposed on third parties as a result of the excessive risk-taking
undertaken by limited liability companies.
The point here is twofold. First, the arguments recounted above in favor
of limited liability for investors in limited liability companies are valid
irrespective of whether there is a public market for the investments that
enjoy limited liability. Thus, contrary to Professor Levmore's suggestion
that limited liability can only be justified when there is a need to pool
investment dollars, ' there are strong arguments in favor of limited
liability even in ventures with only a small number of investors and no
access to the public markets for capital. Indeed, the diversification
arguments made here would still apply even if the limited liability company
had only one investor.
The second point is slightly more subtle. There are reasonable arguments
both for and against granting firms the ability to obtain limited liability
against obligations to tort victims. On the one hand, granting limited
liability helps firms not only to raise capital, but also to encourage
investments in human and firm-specific capital. On the other hand, limiting
liability may lead to excessive risk-taking because firms that enjoy limited
liability do not have to internalize the full costs of their risky activities.
Companies also may organize their activities into subsidiaries specifically
designed to engage in risky activities in order to cabin off the rest of the
firm's assets from potential tort claimants.
While the arguments in favor of limited liability are far stronger than the
59. Id. at 95.
60. See Levmore, supra note 23, at 492.
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arguments against it, particularly in light of the negligible incidence of
firms being bankrupted by tort liability,61 it is noteworthy that the public
policy issues regarding the relative merits of limited liability never entered
the debates about whether to permit limited liability companies. Instead,
states were concerned with protecting the interests of the politically
powerful businessmen and entrepreneurs who planned to take advantage of
this new organizational form. The interests of potential tort victims hardly
registered at all because unidentified, future tort victims are not a
cognizable interest group capable of galvanizing into an effective political
or lobbying coalition. In other words, regardless of the merits of this new
organizational business form, the emergence of the limited liability
company illustrates that the public choice, or interest group, model of the
legislative process is far more robust than the public interest model.62
Consistent with that perspective, legal rules reflect political influence. In
the debate over limited liability companies, the groups favoring the
extension of protection had such influence, and those who stand to be
harmed by the extension of the range of limited liability to new organiza-
tional forms did not. The public interest in a broader sense simply was not
part of the calculation.
B. Piercing the Corporate Veil
The foregoing discussion indicates that as firms that otherwise would
have formed as general partnerships (or even limited partnerships with high
net worth general partners) come to form limited liability companies, the
chances that there will be undercompensated tort victims increases.
However, this is not the end of the story. The lobbying (and fear by the
states of losing tax revenues) that caused states to offer investors the option
of organizing as limited liability companies is legitimate when done before
61. Hansmann & Kraakman, supra note 56, at 1895. The problem of huge administrative costs and
attorneys' fees eroding bankrupts' estates and depriving tort victims of a fund for recovery appears far
more severe than the problem of excessive risk-taking caused by limited liability,
62. The interest group theory of regulation was developed to explain the behavior of legislatures,
which are seen as highly responsive to pressures ftom organized interest groups. The theory posits that
legal rules are demanded and supplied like any other commodity. Regulation is supplied to those groups
that successfully "bid" for it with compensation in the form of political support, campaign contributions,
lobbying expenditures, and the like. The contours of a given law will therefore reflect a competitive
equilibrium among rival interest groups affected by the law. The classic articles exploring the nature
and origins of the interest group theory of regulation are George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT. Sa. 3 (1971) and Sam Peltzman, Towards a More General
Theory of Economic Regulation, 19 J.L. & EcoN. 211 (1976).
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legislatures, where it is commonplace for interest groups and politicians to
trade political support for legislation. But the decisional calculus is much
different in the courts. Judges cannot be lobbied. Unlike legislators, who
often stand to further (or further entrench) their own political careers by
voting a certain way, judges are more likely to determine an issue on the
merits. This unbiased perspective stems from various federal and state
constitutional provisions that isolate the judiciary from political accountabil-
ity.63 Consequently, judges are far less responsive to interest group
pressures than are legislatures.'
And, of course, the courthouse, not the legislature, is likely to be the
final stop on the road to determining the legal environment in which
limited liability companies will operate. Moreover, while the potential tort
victims of limited liability companies are merely an inchoate mass at the
time a state legislature is deciding whether to authorize the limited liability
company, in the context of a lawsuit, these tort victims-and the nature of
their injury-will be clearly identifiable. For these reasons, the problems
of excessive risk-taking faced by tort claimants of limited liability
companies are likely to be resolved-and resolved correctly-by courts
allowing such tort claimants to pierce the corporate veil. As Easterbrook
and Fischel have observed, cases allowing creditors to reach the assets of
shareholders "may be understood, at least roughly, as attempts to balance
the benefits of limited liability against its costs.""5
The point here is simply that since the judges deciding these cases were
not among the political beneficiaries of the original interest group bargains
that led to the promulgation of statutes allowing limited liability companies,
these judges are in a good position to correct any imbalances and injustices
caused by such firms. And, while legislators theoretically could nullify any
future decisions expanding the scope of the doctrines that permit courts to
pierce the veil of limited liability, the political calculus will be much
different because a cognizable class of tort victims has identified itself
through the filing of lawsuits. The lawyers representing these victims will
be a force to be reckoned with, as will the victims and their families.
63. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest-Group Theory of Delaware
Corporate Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 499 (1987).
64. Jonathan R. Macey, PromotingPublic-RegardingLegislation Through Statutory Interpretation:
An Interest Group Model, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 223, 227-30 (1986).
65. Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 57, at 109.
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CONCLUSION
The explosive growth of limited liability companies over the past several
years does not mean that such firms are desirable or efficient. Rather, the
introduction of this new organizational form simply reflects that its
proponents were more effective in encouraging the form than were its
detractors in lobbying against it. However, this observation does not require
the conclusion that such firms are undesirable and inefficient. At times,
interest groups lobby for laws that are efficient from a societal perspective.
These groups will do so as long as the private benefits to them of such
lobbying outweigh the costs. Moreover, to the extent that lobbying
produces inefficient rules relating to limited liability companies, the courts
serve as an important antidote by providing an ex post balancing in which
the interests of groups unrepresented in the original lobbying process are
given an effective voice and a more sympathetic ear. Thus, while Saul
Levmore undoubtedly is correct to describe the limited liability company
as "more an unfortunate product of interest-group politics than a frontier-
expanding innovation,"66 this prescient analysis applies only to the origins
of the limited liability company, not to its future development.
The limited liability company is a curious phenomenon. This Article
argues that while its birth was controlled by the legislature, its future
growth and development will be controlled by the courts.
66. Levmore, supra note 23, at 492.
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